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The U.S. Navy's procedures for repairing and overhauling
Naval vessels in private shipyards is presented as an over-
view. Particular attention is given to the problems the
Navy has experienced in controlling overhaul schedules and
costs, and in distinguishing between growth changes and new
work changes in overhaul contracts. Recommendations include
procedures for standardizing definitions for growth and new
work among Navy activities; simplifying current overhaul
reporting procedures; and upgrading the quality of personnel
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I. INTRODUCTION
Contracting for ship repair and overhaul work has
traditionally been a difficult task, a task that has been
compounded by the Navy's desire to use firm fixed price
contracts for requirements that cannot be accurately and
completely identified prior to the solicitation of bids from
private shipyards. Once a contract is formed and work has
begun, contract changes are normally required for work not
specifically identified in the original solicitation. These
changes frequently cause overhaul costs to significantly
exceed original estimates. The changes can generally be
grouped into the categories of either growth, meaning growth
in a job previously identified in the contract, or new work,
meaning work that is now required that was not included in
the original contract.
"Growth and new work" has become something of a self
contained phrase with a variety of meanings. To the Navy
contract administrator it means a need to process a multi-
tude of urgent contract changes with all the attendent ad-
ministrative headaches. To the Navy auditor it means
looking for new work changes that should have been processed
and funded as new procurements, but were instead buried as
growth changes. To the type commander it means unacceptable
overhaul delays and unaffordable cost overruns. To the

private shipyard it means both the opportunity for addition-
al profits and the potential for seemingly endless problems.
So many meanings have evolved for the terms growth and new
work that the words have become too vague to be meaningful.
Not surprisingly, the call for better definitions is fre-
quently heard both within the Navy and from the private
sector .
For purposes of this paper the terms growth and new work
will be used in the more traditional sense, defined as fol-
lows. Growth is the term used to categorize a change to a
current repair or overhaul contract when the change is with-
in the scope of the contract. Growth changes do not involve
new procurement. Any changes that do not meet these cri-
teria should be categorized as new work. New work require-
ments should be processed as new procurements, using current
fiscal year funds, while growth changes may be funded using
funds originally established for the initial procurement,
even if those funds have expired for obligation purposes.
In essence, a new work change to an overhaul contract is
technically a new procurement, while a growth change is
considered within the scope of the original contract. [1:161
These seemingly simple distinctions between growth and
new work belie the controversy encountered with the terms, a
controversy that has impacted the way ship overhaul con-
tracts are managed, controlled, and evaluated, as well as
the way the Navy conducts its business with ship repair

contractors. Many people have criticized the Navy's manage-
ment of growth and new work in ship overhaul contracts, and
many solutions have been proposed for solving the resulting
problems. But rather than solving problems, the proposed
"solutions" seem to underestimate the complexity of the
issues associated with growth and new work, and rely on
shifting the burden of the problems to someone else. Need-
less to say, those solutions have not been greeted with
universal enthusiasm.
The purpose for this paper is to explore the nature of
the problems of growth and new work, to discuss why the
issue is a complex and difficult problem which pervades the
overhaul process, and to explain why the results from many
of the proposed solutions for managing growth and new work
attempted so far have been so largely disappointing. The
paper concludes with recommendations for approaching the
issue of growth and new work— recommendations which, unfor-
tunately, are neither neat nor easy.
Two circumstances contributed most to the methodology
used in structuring this thesis. First, the topic of growth
versus new work encompasses virtually the entire spectrum of
the ship overhaul process, from the initial decisions re-
garding how Navy ships should be maintained to the settle-
ment of final contract disputes and claims. Secondly,
unlike the new construction environment, which has been and
continues to be the subject of numerous investigations and
8

studies, ship overhauls have not yet become the topic of
extensive study and research.
The limitations of a single thesis require that the
chosen research topic be covered either narrowly and in
depth or very broadly with little detailed analysis of any
one area. Because of the nature of this topic and the lack
of any previous studies upon which to build, it was decided
that if this paper is to provide the background and frame-
work necessary to explain the growth and new work problem,
the overview approach would be most appropriate. This paper
therefore explains the growth versus new work question as
part of the ship overhaul process rather than as a question
that can be extracted and analyzed apart from that process.
The decision to structure the paper as an overview was rein-
forced when it was discovered during initial research that,
while many people who work with ship overhauls are familiar
with the process within the limitations of their individual-
ly assigned tasks, few people really have an understanding
of the rationale behind why the system works as it does. It
was therefore felt that the inclusion of a chapter dealing
with a general discussion of the mechanics of overhauls
would contribute to the continuity of the discussion of
growth and new work.
The network that exists for the repair of Naval vessels
is, of necessity, quite adaptable to the multitude of cir-
cumstances in which it is necessary to accomplish repairs.

This study has not attempted to differentiate among the vast
combinations of situations in which repairs are accom-
plished. The procedures the Navy uses for overhauling its
vessels that are included in this discussion are presented
as the most common way ship overhauls are presently con-
ducted. There are numerous examples of exceptions to these
procedures, some of which are required to accommodate unique
circumstances surrounding specific repair problems and some
of which are undertaken in an effort to find a way around
the many problems confronting ship overhauls.
Included in this thesis is a brief discussion of the
chain of command that most directly affects ship overhauls
and is most visible to those managers who work closely with
the ship repair effort. The discussion is intended as a
framework that must be constructed prior to discussing the
issue of growth and new work. It is not intended as a com-
prehensive study of ship overhaul management and control.
This review of the overhaul process is particularly
directed at the problems encountered during the repair of
Navy non-nuclear surface ships overhauled in private ship-
yards. While the summarization of the overhaul process that
follows is, of necessity, abbreviated, this should not be
interpreted as an over-simplification of that process. There
are few tasks facing the government contracting officer
today that are as difficult or complex as the challenges
that are encountered during the award and administration of
10

contracts for the repair and overhaul of Navy ships. The
discussion presented here can only summarize most of the
significant factors that affect that process. While this
presentation may be tedious for those more familiar with the
overhaul process, the overview is considered necessary to
develop a basic tenet of this thesis— that the problems en-
countered from growth and new work contract changes are
intrinsic to the overhaul process, and that those problems





II. GROWTH AND NEW WORK: THE PROBLEM
Despite significant efforts aimed at bringing more dis-
cipline to the ship overhaul process, uncontrolled costs and
schedule slippages during the repair and overhaul of Navy
ships in private shipyards have, in recent years, become the
norm rather than the exception. Many efforts to identify
ship overhaul problems have been attempted and some progress
toward improving the process has been made. This search for
problems and solutions has, at times, deteriorated into cir-
cuitous arguments of fault-finding between the Navy and
civilian shipyards, while moving the parties no closer to a
solution
.
UNCONTROLLED GROWTH IN SHIP OVERHAULS
Examples of the problems facing ships in overhaul are
not difficult to find. In reviewing figures for overhauls
completed in fiscal year 1980, the effect of these problems
can be seen. Fifty-one non-nuclear surface ship overhauls
were completed during that period. While the original cost
estimates for those overhauls totalled about $436 million,
actual final overhaul costs exceeded this amount by"' almost
$112 million— 25.6 percent in excess of the original esti-
mates. Additionally, of those fifty-one ships, only eigh-
teen completed their overhauls on or before schedule.
Thirty-three of the ships were delivered late. [2]
12

Figures for fiscal year 1981 show little, if any, im-
provement. Of twenty-one ship overhauls completed in the
first two quarters of FY81, fifteen ships were delivered
late. Two of those ships, the minesweeper CONSTANT and the
USS FORT SNELLING, were summarized in Naval Sea Systems
Command's management reports as follows.
The Long Beach Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP)
estimated that the total overhaul for the minesweeper
CONSTANT (MSO-427) would cost approximately $868,000. The
contract was awarded to Larson Boat Shop of Terminal Island,
California, at a cost of $1,111 million. The final overhaul
eventually totalled $1,731 million—almost twice the origi-
nal estimate. The CONSTANT was delivered thirty-five days
late
.
It was estimated by SUPSHIP Portsmouth that the entire
overhaul for the USS FORT SNELLING (LSD-30) would total
$16.0 million. The contract was competitively bid and
awarded to Bethlehem Steel for $20.0 million. The overhaul
was finally completed in the first quarter of FY81 at a
total cost of $30.1 million. The ship was delivered one
hundred sixty-four days late.
Certainly, changes to overhaul contracts are expected.
While overhauls for those fifty-one ships in fiscal year
1980 were estimated to cost $436 million, the initial con-
tract awards for those ships totalled only $336.3 million.
The SUPSHIPs expected an increase of about $100 million, or
13

thirty percent, in growth and new work changes to those
contracts. Actual costs for contract changes eventually
totalled $211.4 million—over twice the amount expected.
With almost forty percent of all ship overhaul dollars being
spent for contract changes, it is apparent that growth and
new work affects virtually every facet of ship overhauls.
Even more significant than these recorded charges to
overhaul costs are the invisible costs encountered in
delaying the return of ships to the fleet. These expenses,
involving additional payroll, housing and travel expenses
that are required for maintaining ships' crews and their
families at overhaul sites, the additional administrative
expenses required in rescheduling other affected overhauls,
as well as the loss of ships to the fleet during the un-
planned extensions of overhauls, cost the Navy many times
over the charges that are billed to those overhauls. During
a time when ships are being recalled from the inactive re-
serve fleet to meet force requirements, the need to minimize
time spent in overhauls has become especially critical.
Given the cost and schedule problems that exist in ship
overhauls, the obvious questions are who is responsible for
this condition and what is being done to correct it. The
answers are both simple and complex. Responsibility is dis-
tributed among so many factions, groups, and individuals
that no one can really claim full responsibility for ship
14

overhauls. As a result, corrective action is difficult to
initiate and almost impossible to effect.
Many solutions to existing problems have been proposed.
Some suggestions, such as assigning all ship overhaul work
to Navy controlled shipyards, or excluding the marginally
performing private yards from participation in Navy contract
work, have an emotional, if not an intuitive, appeal. Other
proposals, such as the avoidance and elimination of unneces-
sary contract changes, and the deferral of all but urgently
required new work into later availability periods, have been
promulgated as policy in Chief of Naval Operations and type
commander directives. Yet the same problems seem to remain
year after year. Experience has shown that significant con-
tract changes occur in even the most tightly controlled
overhauls, and that political, financial, and economic real-
ities dictate that the Navy will continue to do business
with the private sector, which includes doing business with
all too many marginal performers.
This is not to say that solutions do not exist, but only
that many of the solutions attempted invariably seem to
result in a stalemate. This stagnation in the search for
improvements in the overhaul process can be attributed to a
number of factors. With no one really in control of the
overhaul process, solutions unpopular with any one faction
will always be subject to veto. At times, when solutions to
overhaul problems are attempted, a deliberate checking of
15

those initiatives is made by those who perceive the attempt-
ed solutions as compounding the problem. As vrill be shown,
the growth and new work issue is a typical example of this
si tuation
.
There is a general consensus, both in the Navy and with-
in the ship repair industry, that changes are required in
the way growth and new work are managed. Significant
changes have not occurred because those changes that are
favored by industry are considered unfavorable by the Navy,
and vice versa. What then occurs are factions working
toward the common objective of overhauling a Naval vessel
while negating each other's efforts at overcoming the obsta-
cles that hinder that effort.
THE OVERHAUL OF THE USS RALEIGH
Before beginning a more detailed explanation of why such
counter-productive efforts occur, it will be easier first to
illustrate how such incidents occur. The example used here,
specifically the recent overhaul of the USS RALEIGH (LPD-1)
,
is presented to illustrate the background of the problems
encountered with growth and new work. This brief summari-
zation of the RALEIGH'S overhaul is not intended as a cri-
tique of that overhaul or of the way those persons involved
with that overhaul managed the problems that occurred.
While each overhaul is unique, the problems that occured
during the overhaul of the RALEIGH demonstrate some of the
problems which are frequently encountered during ship
16

overhauls. These points are presented here to demonstrate
how growth and new work problems arise and why the measure-
ment of growth and new work is so difficult. [3]
The overhaul contract for the RALEIGH was issued by
SUPSHIP Portsmouth on 13 March 1979. The SUPSHIP estimated
that the RALEIGH'S total overhaul, including growth and new
work contract changes, would cost approximately $15.3 mil-
lion. When the firm fixed price contract was awarded to
Maryland Shipbuilding of Baltimore at an initial price of
$15.2 million, the $15.3 million estimate for total overhaul
costs quickly lost credibility. Originally scheduled for
completion on 16 April 1980, the delivery date was repeat-
edly extended. The RALEIGH was finally able to sail from
Maryland Ship on 19 December 1980, two hundred seventy-three
days beyond the originally scheduled date. Growth and new
work additions required 1,570 contract changes and caused
the price for this overhaul to grow from the original price
of $15.2 million to a total of $25.5 million.
The problems encountered during the RALEIGH'S overhaul
are much too extensive to address in detail here. At the
risk of over-simplifying the complex circumstances that
surrounded that overhaul, two significant problems can be
extracted and examined in hindsight. These two factors are
not considered unique to the RALEIGH'S overhaul, and serve
to illustrate the counter-productive efforts of those in-
volved in the overhaul process mentioned earlier.
17

One of those factors deals with the selection of work
items for inclusion in the basic solicitation distributed as
the Invitation for Bids (IFB). Several major jobs were all
identified as overhaul requirements prior to the issuance of
the IFB, yet none of these items were included in that soli-
citation. Several items, including work on the RALEIGH'S
high and low pressure drains and deballast piping and work
on SHIPALT 250K, a ship alteration designed to increase air
conditioning, were particularly significant. The reason
that was given by the type commander to the SUPSHIP for
delaying the inclusion of this work was that insufficient
funds were available at the beginning of the overhaul to
write the work into the original solicitation. The SHIPALT,
funded by the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) , was appar-
ently delayed for the same reason. When these items were
finally written into the contract, after the award had been
made to Maryland Shipbuilding, the Navy paid dearly. Work
on the drains cost $361,043 and required a delivery date ex-
tension of twenty-three days; the deballast piping cost
$646,000 and required a ninety-eight day extension; the
SHIPALT cost $623,787 and, while requiring no additional
time, served to compound the other jobs by placing addi-
tional demands on the pipefitters' shop.
The second factor that stood out in the RALEIGH'S over-
haul involved work that was initially assigned to the ship's
force for accomplishment, but was subsequently awarded to
18

Lhe shipyard when it became apparent that the work exceeded
the ship's force capabilities. It is difficult to measure
the impact of this factor on an overhaul in terms of dollars
or days' delay, but it was considered by SUPSHIP Portsmouth
to be a significant factor in compounding an already diffi-
cult overhaul .
The problems encountered with the RALEIGH'S overhaul go
far beyond these two factors. These are mentioned primarily
to present the following points. While SUPSHIPs are tasked
with estimating costs and managing overhauls, the scope of
a contract is, in most cases, not definitized until the day
the contract is awarded. Changes are made continuously
while solicitations are "on the street" as well as after bid
opening. In the case of the RALEIGH, major work was delib-
erately excluded until after bid opening, even when it was
known that those jobs had to be accomplished during the
overhaul. Then, following the inclusion of that work into
the contract, additional problems were encountered due to
the migration of work from ship's force responsibility to
shipyard responsibility. The result of problems such as
these is to create cost and schedule estimates that are
often tenuous at best.
These two factors alone were responsible for multi-
million dollar increases in the contract and months of
delay in completing the overhaul. In addition, by delaying
the inclusion of these items into the contract, much of the
19

benefit expected from formally advertising the overhaul re-
quirement was lost. It is something of a paradox that these
extraordinarily expensive actions were accomplished in the
interests of economy. The work was either not included in
the original solicitation or was, in many cases, given to
the ship's force to accomplish because adequate funds were
not available at the time the solicitation was issued to pay
for that work. When funds became available later in that
fiscal year or in the following fiscal year, the contract
grew a full ten million dollars. Time, coupled with the
physical limitations imposed when overhauling a ship in a
private yard, precluded any real competition from being
effected when that additional work was awarded, allowing
Maryland Shipbuilding to price contract changes, including
new work requirements, as a sole source contractor.
The problems encountered during the overhaul of the
RALEIGH at Maryland Shipbuilding were not necessarily sur-
prises. The Navy was aware from the beginning that
RALEIGH'S overhaul could well be more than Maryland Ship-
building could handle. Senior Navy officers and contract
administration personnel met with the shipyard's key person-
nel, including Maryland Ship's general manager and assistant
general manager, biweekly during the overhaul to discuss on-
going problems. While these meetings served to resolve many
issues, they did not ensure a quality overhaul for the
RALEIGH. When the ship sailed from Baltimore, all required
20

work had still not been completed. Five months after com-
pleting the overhaul, a contract was awarded to Norfolk
Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company to complete work on four-
teen new work items that remained outstanding from the over-
haul at Maryland Shipbuilding that were considered too
essential to defer until the next scheduled availability.
Norfolk Shipbuilding estimated the price of this work
package to be approximately $162/000.
After 1,570 contract changes, ten million dollars in
cost growth, two hundred seventy-three total days delay, and
close supervision of the contract by senior Navy and ship-
yard personnel, the RALEIGH could still not obtain a quality
overhaul. On the surface, the RALEIGH'S situation appeared
to be little more than another example of poor cost and
schedule estimating by the SUPSHIP. Further examination
revealed a much more complicated situation in which a con-
tract for a complex repair effort was awarded to a contrac-
tor with limited capabilities to manage such an effort. The
situation was further compounded by the Navy's efforts at
controlling overhaul funds by deliberately deferring criti-
cal work, which ultimately resulted in a loss of control in
managing growth and new work contract changes. The USS
RALEIGH'S overhaul responsibility, allegedly vested in the
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, was circumvented through actions
by the type commander, the Naval Sea Systems Command, the
ship's force, and the shipyard. The ship's overhaul
21

schedule, promulgated by the Chief of Naval Operations,
became basically meaningless as the overhaul dragged on
months beyond the scheduled completion date.
It is this overlapping of authority and interests,
coupled with the legal restraints that are imposed when
dealing with public funds, that makes any effort to solve
the problems of growth and new work the challenge that it
is. An understanding of these relationships of authority,
responsibility, and accountability is required before the
problem can be approached.
22

Ill . THE SHIP OVERHAUL ENVIRONMENT;
CONFLICT AND THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT
The events that occurred during the overhaul of the USS
RALEIGH illustrate how responsibility for the key concerns
of cost, schedule, and quality is shared during overhauls,
as well as how unequal attention is given to those consider-
ations as overhauls progress. This division of responsibi-
lity and authority makes the repair and overhaul of ships a
problem unlike any other that confronts the contracting
officer. It is an environment that often places the con-
tracting officer in the position of being an arbitrator of
disputes between not only the government and the contractor,
but often among factions within the Navy as well. This
chapter will discuss the environment in which the key mem-
bers within the" Navy and within the ship repair industry
must function to resolve the inevitable conflicts and
disputes that occur during overhauls.
THE NAVY VERSUS THE SHIP REPAIR INDUSTRY
Disputes between the Navy and the shipbuilding industry
have become well publicized media events in recent years.
While much has been said about a new spirit of cooperation
between government and industry, recent speeches by leaders
in both the Navy and in the shipbuilding industry seem to
indicate that this new era is more a feeling of the the way
23

things should be rather than the way they are. There are
niany indications that old attitudes of conflict and confron-
tation have changed little.
Edward Campbell, the president and chief executive offi-
cer of Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, in a
presentation to the Hampton Roads Chapter of the National
Contract Management Association in January 1981, opened a
discussion on doing business with the Navy by listing the
advantages of having the Navy as the prime customer of New-
port News Shipbuilding. He then proceeded to discuss the
Navy's "redundant audits, claims certification, and profit
holdbacks, as well as continuing attempts to revise contract
terms and conditions to pass on an undue amount of risk to
the contractor." He chastised "some of the people in
Washington" for their "attempts to force on us new contract
clauses which make it all but impossible for the shipbuilder
to recover cost increases caused by the Navy." Addressing
growth and new work changes, he stated, "We don't believe we
should be forced to release the Navy from its responsibility
to pay for its own mistakes just because those mistakes
don't surface within a prescribed time." [4]
In a speech delivered before the National Press Club in
August 1981, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman acknowledged
some problems with government contracts, but stated, "By a
wide margin most of our shipbuilding programs are on cost,
and on schedule, and are being very well managed." He then
24

proceeded to discuss the "mistakes, the negligence, the poor
workmanship, [and] the inadequate management" of one of the
Navy's most important shipbuilders, General Dynamics
Electric Boat Division. [5]
Public debate of the government's problems can, in one
sense, be considered a fundamental part of a democratic
system. An occasional poignant comment delivered by an
industry or government leader must be taken within the
context of the politics of the moment and the history of
past events. Yet the relationship between the Navy and the
shipyards has transcended the level of a public discussion
of alternatives. In all too many transactions, conflict
between the Navy and the shipyards has become the way that
day-to-day business is conducted.
THE SHIP REPAIR INDUSTRY
In a study of the shipbuilding industry conducted by the
firm of Edward M. Kaitz and Associates for the Office of
Naval Research, the following point was made:
Few businessmen like to be reminded of their
dependency on one customer not only for the bulk of
their business, but also for access to the funding not
otherwise available to them from the capital markets
because of the circularity of their capital and low
profits. Except for the most patient of business
executives, the situation is fraught with conflict.
[6:26]
The shipbuilding industry today certainly fits within
Kaitz's definition of dependency upon one customer. The
Washington Post described it as an industry that appeared
25

"destined to become a virtual appendage of the military."
The Shipbuilding Council's own statistics paint an equally
dim picture. Two-thirds of the nation's 99,000 shipyard
production workers are presently employed on Navy projects.
For every one dollar in commercial work, private shipyards
receive nine dollars for Navy work. M. Lee Rice, the
president of the Ogden Corporation's shipbuilding subsid-
iary, stated, "The decline in commercial orders leaves us
creatures of the Navy." [7]
While the statistics and quotes cited here were origi-
nally written specifically about the shipbuilding industry,
there are obviously many correlations that can be drawn
between the shipbuilding and the ship repair industries.
With labor costs in these industries totalling over half of
all production costs, both can be considered labor inten-
sive. [6:5] These industries have been severely affected by
foreign competition, and both have lost most major commer-
cial business to shipyards overseas. [8] This lack of
business and resulting excess capacity have created intense
competition, and both industries have become dependent on
the Navy for obtaining the work that spells the difference
between, either financial survival or corporate demise. Both
industries are large employers, and are considered critical
to the nation's defense mobilization requirements. As a




There are, however, some marked differences between the
two industries, not the least of which is their difference
in size. While shipyards capable of building vessels are
equally capable of repairing those vessels, businesses that
are exclusively ship repair activities are typically much
smaller, and are lacking in the expensive and sophisticated
technology that exists in the larger shipyards. There are
almost two hundred contractors holding master ship repair
(MSR) contracts, but only eleven have the facilities that
are required to build ships for the Navy. [9]
While some ship repair contractors have made extensive
investments in facilities, the repair of Naval vessels
remains a labor intensive endeavor that is limited in its
ability to achieve efficiencies through automation. As a
result, there are relatively few barriers to entry into the
ship repair business. [6:7] However, once new contractors
have entered the field, there are political pressures that
work to keep those contractors in business by ensuring that
entry into government contract work remains accessible. As
a result, the purging of inefficient businesses that would
be expected within a competitive environment during times of
excess capacity has been restricted by a government that is
interested in both keeping workers and voters employed while




These small businesses have responded to this environ-
ment by showing an almost remarkable ability to survive
during austere times. In addition to government contract
work that has kept them solvent, the ability of these con-
tractors to remain in business can largely be attributed to
the flexibility of the industry's labor force. In an
environment as labor intensive as the ship repair industry,
the labor force has become the single most critical resource
these contractors must manage. An idle labor force consti-
tutes a luxury that even the largest shipyards cannot af-
ford. As a result, the labor force, including both blue
collar and middle management personnel, is continually in
flux, as each worker looks ahead to the next job with the
shipyard that has been successful in winning ship repair
contract work. By keeping both capital investments and the
size of the payroll as small as possible, the ship repair
contractor has been able to remain in business.
THE NAVY'S CONFLICT OF GOALS
It is within this range of contractor talent, from the
most sophisticated and technologically capable shipbuilders
to these borderline survivors, that the Navy must deal on a
daily basis for accomplishing its ship repair work. It
would certainly be in the interests of the ship repair in-
dustry if the Navy were organized in a manner that would
allow it to effectively cope with this range of contractors.
This goal could be accomplished— if this were the single, or
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even the most important, goal to be achieved. Instead, the
situation facing the Navy requires an organization that must
adapt to a complex mix of goals and a continual revision of
priorities
.
An example of the Navy's continuing contradiction of
goals can be seen within the overhaul of the USS RALEIGH.
Within that overhaul, budget restraints initially dictated
the scope of the overhaul contract that was signed. Work
requirements midway through contract performance inflated
both overhaul costs and schedules beyond original plans.
Finally, schedule requirements demanded that the ship be
removed from the contractor's shipyard before all contracted
work had been completed. While all these events shaped the
eventual outcome of the overhaul, none of the three varia-
bles of cost, schedule, or work requirements were ever
established as the single most important overhaul priority
to be met.
This single view of the RALEIGH'S overhaul can be ex-
panded to the Navy's approach to overhaul management in
general. Is the object of the ship repair mission to
maximize dollars allocated to the ship repair account in any
one fiscal year, or to use taxpayers' dollars efficiently in
general? Is the purpose of ship overhauls to extend the
useful lives of ships, or to ensure that the Navy's opera-
tional commitments can be met? Should the Navy work to
provide jobs for American taxpayers, or is the primary
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concern that some level of expertise be maintained to
protect the nation's ability to mobilize in times of war?
While it would be easy to say that the purpose for the ship
repair effort is to repair ships, it quickly becomes appar-
ent that, to some extent, all of these objectives are goals
that must be included in the way the Navy manages its over-
haul effort. It is necessary for many interests to be
included and protected, even when those interests occasion-
ally conflict.
The Navy's organizational structure must be able to
respond to both routine and urgent ship repair requirements.
It must be able to accommodate national requirements for
maintaining an industrial ship repair capability and it must
consider local requirements when awarding contracts on a
regional basis, all while attempting to ensure that Naval
shipyard capacity is neither grossly under-utilized nor
over-extended. It must be able to forecast fleet require-
ments with a view toward future unknown missions while
ensuring that those yet-to-be-built ships can be economi-
cally constructed, effectively operated, and efficiently
repaired. The Navy must be capable of preparing and defend-
ing budget requests years in advance of requirements. When
funds are appropriated, the Navy must be able to channel a
portion of those funds to the ships requiring repairs and
overhauls through the contractors that must perform those
repairs, and must do so before those funds expire. Finally,
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it must perform these tasks in a manner that will remain
within the guidelines prescribed by law and regulation while
attempting to minimize litigation from contractors' protests
and disputes. Shipyards are organized and structured to
repair ships. The Navy is not.
THE NAVY'S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR REPAIRING SHIPS
The system is unquestionably cumbersome and bureau-
cratically complex, and the cry is frequently heard that
"something should be done." Beyond this point, it becomes
unclear who is responsible for taking such action and what
action, if any, can be taken. In reviewing the overhaul
process, it becomes even more difficult to identify any step
in the lengthy process that can be extracted and deleted
while simultaneously improving that process.
The first step in analyzing the ability to change begins
with understanding how the process now works. While there
are any number of ways to count the key members within the
Navy that affect the overhaul process in some way, the prin-
cipal organizational entities within the Navy responsible
for managing overhauls is limited to only three— the Chief
of Naval Operations (the CNO) , the Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA) , and the type commanders. Within these organiza-
tions are three subordinate organizations involved with ship
overhauls on a more mundane level. These are the Supervi-
sors of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair (the SUPSHIPs),
who report to NAVSEA; Planning and Estimating for Repairs
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and Alterations (the PERAs) , who also report to NAVSEA; and
the commanding officers of the ships undergoing overhaul,
who report to their type commanders.
While individuals within these organizations are collec-
tively responsible for managing ship overhauls conducted in
private shipyards, only one— the Chief of Naval Operations--
can claim full responsibility and accountability for that
effort. Since he also is the one most distant from the
problems facing ships in overhaul, the Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations (OPNAV) relies almost exclusively on
input provided from NAVSEA and the type commanders, through
the chain of command, to evaluate ship overhaul problems.
The CNO's primary mission is not to analyze and solve
administrative problems arising during overhauls, but to
maintain the operational readiness of the fleet. It is in
this capacity that the CNO promulgates ship overhaul sched-
ules for all ships of the fleet. The schedule, updated
quarterly, uses input from both NAVSEA and the type command-
ers. The consolidated report specifies which ships can be
relieved of their operational commitments, allowing them to
be overhauled, while ensuring force requirements can still
be met with remaining assets. The directive provides a
general overhaul schedule five years hence (the "notional
schedule"), with specific action normally initiated about
two years prior to each scheduled overhaul commencement.
Outwardly, the OPNAV schedule seems to be no more than
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another directive for tentatively planning overhauls. When
considering the interrelationship of factors that are
required to promulgate this schedule, the magnitude of this
task can be more readily appreciated. The schedule must not
only forecast operational commitments for years to come but
also must attempt to estimate repair requirements for dozens
of vessels ranging in age from newly commissioned ships to
ships that are decades old, and then extrapolate from those
estimates both the time and cost required for repairs.
Obviously, the schedule produced can be no more valid
than the data that is used in making such forecasts.
Providing the technical and the management data necessary
for meeting the Navy's ship construction and repair require-
ments is a principal function of the Naval Sea Systems
Command. Through the consolidation of many organizations
once tasked with specialized repair, construction, and oper-
ational concerns, NAVSEA has evolved into the Navy's largest
systems command. Included within that organization is the
central responsibility for contracting for ships and ship
systems
.
The purpose for this consolidation of many organiza-
tional entities into one command responsible for all ship
systems was to streamline the bureaucracy by bringing to-
gether groups that shared a common concern in managing the
Navy's ships and ship systems. This was the goal, but it is
difficult to measure how well it has been achieved. One
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example of problems the consolidation has caused can be seen
in the way NAVSEA manages their ship overhaul duties.
While NAVSEA holds the responsibility for technical as well
as contractual matters pertaining to ship overhauls, this
concentration of authority is subsequently diluted by dis-
persion of that responsibility and authority throughout the
organization as well as among subsidiary field
organi za tions
.
Assigned as parts of NAVSEA are two such field organiza-
tions, the SUPSHIPs and the PERAs . These organizations are
tasked with the responsibility for planning and managing
ship overhauls, but they depend upon the central organiza-
tion of NAVSEA for policy and procedural guidance. While
their missions are closely related, the SUPSHIPs and the
PERAs are organizationally segregated, ostensibly for pur-
poses of concentrating specialized expertise into areas
which ultimately will result in greater continuity of proce-
dures and more efficient operations.
Of the two organizations, the PERAs are the least rigid-
ly structured. Originally conceived in the early 1970's as
an organization designed to provide NAVSEA with technical
evaluative information pertaining to ship systems, the PERAs
have since evolved into something of a "catch-all" organiza-
tion that provides a variety of test, inspection, and evalu-
ation functions for the type commanders as well as NAVSEA.
Operating from five different field offices which have been
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organized by ship types, the PERAs are directly involved
with ship overhauls by being assigned responsibility for
advanced planning for overhauls.
Planning for ship overhauls is the first step in the
process that will ultimately determine the scope of the
contract that will be awarded for the overhaul. In an
effort to make the work package as accurate and complete as
possible, the PERAs initiate a fairly rigorous process that
includes the physical inspection of the ships to be over-
hauled, the validation of equipment on board those ships,
and the ordering of long-lead-time parts and materials. To
provide as complete an overhaul work package as possible,
the PERAs use contracted assistance as well as technical
representatives from SUPSHIPs, Naval shipyards, and type
commanders's staffs when conducting the "ship checks" that
will eventually determine the work to be performed. Data
collected eventually becomes the baseline work requirements
packages for overhauls. [10]
The work packages prepared by the PERAs are subject to a
number of reviews before being delivered to the SUPSHIPs for
development of the solicitation. Each repair, overhaul,
modernization, or alteration job must be reviewed for tech-
nical feasibility and funding responsibility. Once this
review procedure is completed, the package is delivered to





The cost estimating process within the SUPSHIP is nor-
mally accomplished by individuals who have received the
majority of their training through experience in working
with ship systems as mechanics or technicians. Estimates
are made by breaking requirements down into basic systems,
which allows costs for direct materials and direct labor to
be more easily determined. Estimates are also made for the
overhead, general and administrative expenses, and profit
that contractors are expected to include in their bid pro-
posals. However, due to the dramatic differences in size
among contractors bidding on ship repair work, cost esti-
mates _for other than direct materials and direct labor are
normally "ballpark" estimates at best.
Approximately six months prior to the commencement of
the overhaul a work definition conference is held. [11] Up
until this point, the work that has been screened by the
PERA and the SUPSHIP has included virtually every job that
was either required or desired by NAVSEA, the type command-
er, or the ship. Once the SUPSHIP has completed the price
estimations for the work requirements, it normally becomes
apparent that limited funds will provide the main constraint
in restricting the scope of the overhaul contract to be
awarded. The purpose for the work definition conference is
to reduce the work package to those items that will be
either included in the solicitation for bids or assigned to
the ship's force for performance. The items remaining,
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considered as being too expensive or too complex for per-
formance during the overhaul, are either deleted entirely or
modified in such a manner that they can be included in one
of the first two categories.
The work package that results from the work definition
conference is supposed to be the final package that will
serve as the statement of work in the invitation for bids.
Only work that is screened by the type commander or NAVSEA
and is labelled as an emergent requirement is to be forwaded
for processing as an amendment to the work package and
contract solicitation.
The role of the type commander in the overhaul process
is one of indirect control of the overhaul through direct
control of funds that are allocated to the overhaul. Since
the type commander is responsible for both the ship's being
overhauled as well as the funds required for the overhaul,
he subsequently has the authority to approve or disapprove
most of the work that is included in the overhaul work
package .
While the type commanders' authority is substantial, it
is not absolute. NAVSEA, as the organization responsible
for approving all work that modifies or alters any design or
configuration of the ship, has a great deal of control in
authorizing and directing any substantive changes to ship
systems. When changes are made that affect the designed
operational or safety characteristics of systems, NAVSEA
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normally will initiate the change and provide both the tech-
nical information as well as the funding required to effect
those changes.
It is the responsibility of the SUPSHIPs to coordinate
the requirements that flow from NAVSEA, the type commanders,
and the ships into contracts and then to administer those
contracts. While the SUPSHIPs are responsible neither for
originating the requirements that are included in overhaul
contracts nor for changing requirements once those contracts
are awarded, the fact that it is the SUPSHIPs who must esti-
mate overhaul costs and then contract for all such work
places them in the position of assuming responsibility for
contractual problems that result.
The process discussed so far has briefly touched on some
of the major responsibilities of NAVSEA, the SUPSHIPs, the
PERAs , and the type commanders. Frequently excluded from
discussions of the overhaul process is the role of the ships
themselves and the officers who command those ships. The
responsibility of ship commanding officers during overhauls
is a dichotomy. The commanding officers have virtually no
authority over ship overhaul funds or schedules. They are
not authorized to include new work in overhaul contracts,
nor may they direct changes to those contracts. Yet while
their authority is severely limited, they are still consid-
ered responsible for their ships.
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Commanding officers, who may have very limited experi-
ence in overhauling ships and who normally have no formal
training in contract administration, find themselves in the
position of being able to exercise significant control over
how overhaul contracts are administered. This authority is
never expressed in any transfer of the administrative con-
tracting officer's authority, but is derived from the fact
that the ship must function as a partner with the shipyard
to coordinate the accomplishment of work. While the ship-
yard and the ship's force work from two different lists of
jobs to be performed, the work is frequently interrelated.
Gauges and meters must be calibrated by the ship's force
before fuel tanks overhauled by the shipyard can be fully
closed out. Bulkheads to be painted by the ship's force
must be first installed by the shipyard. Work that is not
performed to the satisfaction of the ship's commanding offi-
cer must be reinspected, and possibly reworked, regardless
of how contract statements of work may be written. The
potential for conflicts between shipyards and ship's crews
is enormous, and conflicts frequently occur.
One major reason it is difficult to resolve conflicts
that occur during ship overhauls is that it is often
difficult to identify the history leading up to the
conflict. Occasionally, trivial problems and objections are
raised by both contractors and the government. Occasion-
ally, issues that are ignored as trivial by both sides have
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mrepercussions months later when major equipment must be
pulled to perform inspections that were omitted or to re-
place valves that were overlooked. The questions that arise
are often very difficult to answer. Who was responsible for
the oversight? Who should pay for the problems that occur?
Who should pay for the delay, disruption, and acceleration
that resulted? Should the costs and responsibility be
shared, and if so, in what proportions?
It is here that coping with the Navy's bureaucracy
becomes especially difficult. If the Naval Sea Systems
Command authorized a change that was directed and funded by
the type commander, a change that was researched and docu-
ented by the PERA, performed by the contractor, and in-
spected by the SUPSHIP, who is responsible for subsequent
problems? Given the Navy's organization for managing over-
hauls, the answer is that rarely is anyone in a position to
assume full responsibility for specifying all actions re-
quired to correct problems that occur, and then to pay for
those actions.
Within the shipbuilding and ship repair environment that
exists today, conflict will remain as a part of the overhaul
process. The result is that the contracting officer's role
often becomes one of conflict resolution rather than one of
conflict avoidance. Unfortunately, the structure that
exists between the Navy and industry is poorly designed to
address and resolve conflict.
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Growth and new work is an issue of conflict. It is
within this organizational structure that problems which
arise during overhauls must be solved. As mentioned
earlier, the federal government, and the Navy in particular,
are structured to deal with a range of problems that far
exceed the direct concerns of ship overhauls and repairs.
Attempting to resolve conflicting goals and contradictory
objectives within this structure has been one significant
factor that has caused the issue of growth and new work to
become a political as well as a managerial issue.
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IV. CONTRACTING FOR SHIP OVERHAULS
Criticism of the way the government manages its affairs
is often followed by a statement to the effect that the gov-
ernment would run much more efficiently if it could only
employ the sound business practices proven to be effective
in industry. In reviewing the way private shipping lines
repair their ships, it is apparent that the way the govern-
ment and industry effect ship repairs are markedly differ-
ent, and that many ship overhaul and repair problems are
unique to government contract work.
When repairs to a privately owned vessel are required,
the owners select several contractors considered capable of
performing the work. Those contractors inspect the ship to
be repaired and prepare estimates. On the basis of those es-
timates, a contract is awarded and the work is accomplished.
When problems occur during the repair work, a technically
capable individual representing the vessel's owners makes a
decision, normally at the scene, regarding the way the con-
tractor should proceed. When the work is completed, the
contractor is paid his costs and profit. If the work is not
completed satisfactorily, or is not completed on schedule,
or if the price is too high, the vessel's owners will choose
a different contractor when the next requirement comes due.
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The Navy's procedures for selecting contractors and
awarding and administering contracts for ship repair work is
quite different. Requirements that are known years in ad-
vance are often awarded only weeks, and sometimes days,
before the overhauls begin. Contractors with records of
poor performance are rarely excluded from bidding for addi-
tional contract work. Contracts are awarded on the basis of
contractor replies to the Navy's invitation for bids, with
some consideration given to the complexity of the work in-
volved and the contractor's ability to perform. Contractors
winning the award may never have seen the ships that are to
be overhauled. Changes to contracted work are frequently
required but are normally accomplished only after written
reports are prepared, funds are allocated, and numerous
approvals are received. When the repairs are completed,
contractors are not always reimbursed in a timely manner for
work that is performed and for costs that are incurred, re-
sulting in time-consuming disputes and lengthy claims
processing .
The reason the Navy gives for conducting its business in
a manner that is so disparate from its commercial counter-
part is because the Navy must comply with federal laws and
regulations. This chapter will review the overhaul require-
ments themselves and will discuss the regulatory environment
in which those contracts are written.
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FINANCIAL CONTROL AND THE SHIP OVERHAUL PROCESS
The regulations confronting government contracting offi-
cials are, to say the least, extensive. Central to any
discussion concerning regulations surrounding the overhaul
process is the role of the Congress, which is largely re-
sponsible for most regulations affecting government contract
work. The rationale behind most Congressionally mandated
regulations is, for the most part, fairly straightforward.
The Congress has attempted to structure legislation in a
manner that will contribute to the achievement of specified
socio-ecomomic goals and objectives while ensuring tax dol-
lars are spent effectively. One of the basic financial con-
trol procedures used by the Congress, the appropriation of
funds on a fiscal year basis, is also at the base of the
growth and new work controversy.
Authorizing the expenditure of funds at the beginning of
each fiscal year provides the Congress with the means to
control the continuation of many federal programs. Funds
provided for ship conversion and repair are included in this
process. In the case of ship overhauls, funds allocated to
this account must be obligated, through the awarding of con-
tracts, in the same year the funds are appropriated. Once
the fiscal year has ended, funds appropriated for that year
may no longer be obligated for new requirements. However,
those funds may be used to pay for goods and services for
which contracts have already been made. This limitation on
44

the expenditure of funds is central to the issue of growth
and new work.
The way this requirement affects ship overhauls can best
be illustrated through the use of an example. Assume a con-
tract was made for the replacement of a ship's turbine in
September 1981 (fiscal year 1981), and that work commenced
that same fiscal year. If the work was not completed until
October 1981 (fiscal year 1982), payment for those repairs
may still be made using fiscal year 1981 funds, since those
were the funds originally cited in the contract. If unex-
pected complications occurred during those repairs and a
higher price for the work was negotiated in fiscal year
1982, payment could still legally be made in fiscal year
1982 using FY81 funds. This is an example of using lapsed
funds to pay for growth work.
An example of new work can be made by expanding this
illustration. Assume, during repairs to the turbine, it is
discovered that an oil pump is also found to be defective.
The circumstances then become quite different. Since the
contracted repairs did not include repair or replacement of
the oil pump, a new procurement is now involved. Federal
law states that new procurements may not cite funds for a
fiscal year that has expired. If the defective pump is
discovered in fiscal year 1982, FY81 funds that are being




What then occurs is that the Navy, or more specifically
the SUPSHIP, is responsible for managing two different ac-
counts for the type commander while attempting to repair one
ship. The situation becomes even more complicated if the
overhaul is drawn out through three fiscal years. When this
situation is overlayed with related work that is being
funded by NAVSEA as ship alterations, (funds which are sub-
ject to the same type of restrictions) , the allocation of
funds can quickly deteriorate into a fairly arbitrary pro-
cess. Not surprisingly. Naval Audit Service reports con-
cerning the management of these funds are replete with
examples of such problems.
The purpose for such regulations is apparent. In the
absence of such regulations, programs that Congress chooses
to cancel by discontinuing the allocation of current fiscal
year funds could be continued indefinitely. If the agency
holding unobligated funds from prior fiscal years chose to
continue funding programs through the expenditure of those
funds, this Congressional control mechanism would be all but
eliminated .
Secondly, to ensure prices paid for new procurements are
fair and reasonable. Congress has directed that all new re-
quirements be formally advertised and competed to the maxi-
mum extent practical. In the absence of such a directive,
an agency could award a contract for one item and, through
the use of changes to that contract, buy goods or services
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that are completely outside the scope of the original
contract
.
DEFINING THE SCOPE OF OVERHAUL CONTRACTS
Controlling funds through fiscal year restrictions is
not a significant problem in the great majority of
government contracts. At times, contracting officers are
faced with the option of either directing a change to a
contract that may be questionable, such as a change that may
be outside the scope of a contract, or initiating a new
procurement. Most contracting officers will choose the less
controversial option and direct that a new procurement be
initiated
.
The situation facing the SUPSHIP, however, is not as
clearly defined. Ships undergoing extensive overhauls are
normally so time constrained that it is impractical to com-
petitively bid new requirements discovered during the
overhauls. If repairs are not accomplished at the time
problems are found, it is usually difficult, if not
impossible, to effect repairs later. When it is determined
that repairs are required, the contracting officer normally
directs the contractor holding the overhaul contract to
accomplish those repairs. It is impractical to compete a
new requirement and expect several contractors to work on
different, and possibly related, equipment in the same ship
at the same time. Neither time nor good managment control
procedures can allow such strict compliance with the
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Congressionally mandated preference for competition. Any
savings obtained from competing such requirements would be
exceeded by costs incurred from schedule delays, inefficien-
cies in controlling the work, and contractors' claims.
Still there remains a concern regarding whether the
growth experienced within ship overhaul contracts can be
considered within the scope of those contracts. Overhaul
contract changes, which are normally unilateral changes di-
rected by contracting officers, are frequently the source of
claims and disputes. Rarely, however, are the unilateral
changes directed by contracting officers challenged by con-
tractors as being "cardinal changes," or changes outside the
scope of the overhaul contracts.
There are at least two reasons for this. First, given
the excess capacity that presently exists within the ship
repair industry, contract changes provide a significant por-
tion of shipyard business, which in turn translates into
shipyard profits. It would make little sense for a ship
repair contractor to protest a sole source award to his
shipyard when such work is essential to his survival. The
second reason is simply because mosts protests involving
claims that contracting officers exceeded their authority by
directing cardinal changes have been unsuccessful. Such
claims often hinge on whether or not the contractor expected
the contract to be modified as directed. Given the past
history of overhaul contracts, it would be difficult for a
48

contractor to claim that he entered into an overhaul con-
tract unaware that major changes to the contract would
occur
.
Similar claims outside the ship repair industry have es-
tablished precedents that would discourage most contractors
from pursuing this argument. In one case involving changes
to a contract for the new construction of a submarine at
General Dynamics's Electric Boat Division, the Court of
Claims held that major design changes to the submarine, in-
cluding changes involving the lengthening of the hull, were
within the scope of the contract. The Court stated that
when an item as complex as a submarine is being constructed,
the ship "normally undergoes changes as construction pro-
gresses and superior solutions are developed to continuing
problems." The Court refused to confine itself "to com-
paring the number of parts changed and unchanged." The
major argument the Court offered in finding against General
Dynamics was that General Dynamics could not have reasonably
counted on completing the construction of the submarine
without disruption by change orders. [12]
The principles established in the General Dynamics case
were reiterated in a recent protest to the General Account-
ing Office, in which the Comptroller General stated:
The [General Accounting Office] has recognized that non-
competitive awards may be made where the minimum needs of
the Government can be satisfied only by items or services
which are unique, where time is of the essence and only
one known source can meet the Government's needs within
the required time frame, where data is unavailable for
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competitive procurement, or where only a single source can
provide an item which must be compatible and interchange-
able with existing equipment. [13]
EVALUATING GROWTH AND NEW WORK
While these and similar cases provide the precedents ne-
cessary to allow questions involving the scope of overhaul
contracts to be sucessfully skirted, they do not resolve the
issue regarding the proper allocation of growth and new work
funds. To the contractor repairing the ship, the account
that is cited for payment of overhaul work is of little con-
sequence. But compounding the contractor's situation is
another view of ship overhauls that the contractor seldom
sees. There is a perception, well above the waterfront
level of management, that the quality of overhaul management
can be measured by comparing the dollars that are contribu-
ted to growth work to the dollars that are contributed to
new work.
This argument holds that expenditures for new work indi-
cate poor overhaul planning and management, since any work
that was really required would have been properly included
in the solicitation and contract. Additionally, the argu-
ment states that excessive expenditures for growth work are
probably the fault of the contractor, since the contractor
should have been able to evaluate properly jobs cited in the
solicitation prior to bidding for the work. Likewise, new
work requirements are probably caused by poor planning on
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the part of the Navy, since this is work that should have
been included in the contract from the beginning.
It was this philosophy in evaluating overhauls that
prompted a letter in April 1981 from Stuart Adamson, the
Vice President of the Shipbuilders Council of America, to
the Contract Administration Division of the Naval Sea Sys-
tems Command. In that letter, Mr. Adamson protested the
Navy's "misleading" figures used in evaluating overhauls,
and the lack of any "clearly established rule for identify-
ing actually what is 'new work,'" [14]
It was Mr. Adamson's understanding, based on the Navy's
criticism of overhaul work accomplished in private ship-
yards, that because most changes to contracts were being
funded with prior fiscal year funds, the Navy felt that it
was paying in both time and dollars for work that should
have been apparent to contractors at the time of award. The
unspoken criticism was that private contractors were
"buying" overhaul contracts, knowing that they could "get
well" on changes.
Mr. Adamson held that if the Navy properly recognized
new work, it would be apparent that delays and cost overruns
were the result of the Navy's making major new work changes
to contracts after the contracts were awarded. In essence,
the issue at question involved the effectiveness of using
the fiscal distinction between growth funds and new work
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funds as a tool for measuring the quality of overhaul
management
.
The distinction established by Congress for segregating
fiscal year funds was established so that Congress could ex-
ercise some control over those funds. Using this distinc-
tion as a tool to evaluate overhauls might have some value,
but only if the Navy consistently makes the distinction be-
tween growth and new work when additional overhaul funds are
required. However, there is presently no consistent method
for selecting which funds to use, nor is there a consensus
regarding who is responsible for making the determination
concerning which funds to use. As the Navy presently man-
ages these funds, there is a great deal of discretion at the
SUPSHIP and type commander level regarding how growth and
new work are funded. Examples of such inconsistencies can
be found in reviewing procedures followed by three different
SUPSHIPs.
In a March 1981 audit of the Supervisor of Shipbuilding
at Long Beach, California, the Naval Audit Service found
that SUPSHIP Long Beach used funds from an expired appropri-
ation for work outside the scope of the original work speci-
fications rather than funds current at the time the modifi-
cations to the contracts were issued. The Naval Audit
Service claimed that they found instances in which SUPSHIP
Long Beach funded new work using growth funds. This action
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is an apparent violation of Section 3678 of 31 U.S. Code
628, which involves the improper used of expired funds.
The SUPSHIP replied by concurring with the facts as
found by the Naval Audit Service, but the SUPSHIP did not
state that corrective action would be taken. SUPSHIP Long
Beach was of the opinion that the type commander and the
fleet commander were authorized to cite funds for directed
work as they saw fit. In reply to this argument, the Naval
Audit Service stated:
Direction from the customer cannot be seen as a reason,
since SUPSHIP is responsible for seeing that public funds
are spent in accordance with the law. [1:16]
These procedures can be contrasted to procedures fol-
lowed by the Supervisor of Shipbuilding at San Francisco,
who recognizes that the growth or new work determination is
a SUPSHIP function. At SUPSHIP San Francisco, the determi-
nation is made by officers assigned to the SUPSHIP as avail-
ability managers. Written guidance is provided in the form
of a procedural memorandum signed by the officer in charge
of the availability managers, a procedure that was subse-
quently incorporated in a SUPSHIP instruction. [15]
The procedures followed by the Supervisor of Shipbuild-
ing at Portsmouth, Virginia, were found to be different from
either San Francisco or Long Beach. Guidance is also pro-
mulgated in a SUPSHIP instruction, but the growth or new
work determination is made by the administrative contracting
officer rather that by technical personnel. In addition,
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the SUPSHIP instruction sets forth definitions to be used in
distinguishing between growth and new work, as follows:
Growth Work
. Work that is closely and directly associated
with the equipment component and system specified in the
existing job order; does not materially alter the charac-
ter or expand the job order to include additional work to
any degree; and meets at least one of the following
requirements
:
(1) Additional work required resulting from reports
required in the original specifications.
(2) Additional work required to complete the repairs of
a specific equipment component or structural member in an
original specification.
(3) Additional work required to repair a specific equip-
ment component or ship's structure so that all tests pre-
scribed in the existing job order may be conducted.
(4) Items written for clarification purposes.
New Work . Work not relating to the original job order
speci f ications which increases the scope of the job order
or changes the scope of the job order. An increase in
quantity to be repaired, WHICH EXCEEDS THAT WHICH WAS
ORIGINALLY APPROVED BY TYCOM [emphasis theirs] , is an
example of new work. [16]
One significant procedural problem in attempting to gain
consistency among SUPSHIPs regarding the growth and new work
determination involves the apparent lack of any firm guid-
ance from NAVSEA regarding how the determination should be
made. Despite frequent reference to the terms, the Ship
Repair Manual is silent regarding definitions. The only
reference cited by both the Naval Audit Service and Super-
visors of Shipbuilding regarding policy guidance from NAVSEA
consists of a single letter issued by NAVSEA's SUPSHIP Man-
agement Division (Code 074) in December 1978. The letter
provided a listing of seven categories for growth and five
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categories for new work, with appropriate codes to be used
for completing overhaul reports. The letter defined growth
and new work as follows:
Gi^owth—Any change to a SARP [the overhaul requirements
package] Work item (increase or decrease) that remains
within the scope of the work authorized by the TYCOM [type
commander] after issuance of the last supplemental bid
package (normally award date for private sector overhauls)
shall be considered growth.
New Work—Any work beyond the scope authorized for the
industrial activity by the TYCOM after issuance of last
supplemental bid package (normally award date for private
sector overhauls) would be considered new work.
The letter did not include a definition for the term
"scope," nor were fiscal requirements or the responsibili-
ties of the type commanders addressed.
In addition to inconsistent procedures used by the
SUPSHIPs, a second problem arises when attempting to use the
dollars spent for growth and the dollars spent for new work
to measure the quality of overhaul management. The distinc-
tion between growth and new work is only relevent when over-
hauls lapse fiscal years. All changes that occur in the
same fiscal year in which the contract is awarded are paid
for with "growth" funds, regardless of whether the change is
unquestionably "new work" or not. The NAVSEA letter attemp-
ted to make this distinction through the coding of overhaul




COST CONTRACTS AND SHIP OVERHAULS
While better rules for evaluating growth and new work
may contribute to a standardization of procedures among
SUPSHIPs, the problem of uncontrolled growth and new work in
ship overhaul contracts will be helped little by better def-
initions alone. Cost overruns create the appearance of
waste and mismanagement of public funds. This impression is
compounded when the contracts involved are firm fixed price
contracts awarded on the basis of formal advertising. When
final prices paid exceed prices cited in the basic contract
by twenty-five to fifty percent or more, the contractor has
no incentive to control contract costs, since losses will
normally be covered through contract changes. In other
words, the basic concern that contractors can "buy in" on
contracts and "get well" on changes is a valid concern that
is not precluded by the use of formal advertising for ship
overhaul contracts.
There is no single way to contract for the government's
requirements that is not without drawbacks, and formal ad-
vertising is no exception. While optimal contract types for
use in ship construction have been extensively studied, con-
tracts for ship repair and overhaul work, accomplished under
master ship repair contracts, have traditionally been for-
mally advertised.
The use of formal advertising and firm fixed price con-
tracts has historically proven to be an effective combi-
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nation for contracting for the government's requirements,
providing the essential ingredients for using this method of
procurement exists. The conditions for using formal adver-
tising require an environment in which genuine competition
exists; the requirements can be adequately defined to allow
all competitors to be able to understand fully those re-
quirements; and adequate time exists for the government to
prepare solicitations, for contractors to prepare proposals
in reply to those solicitations, and for the government to
evaluate the proposals and the ability of the low bidder to
perform. [17]
Given the competitive environment that exists among
shipyards, adequate competition does exist for most overhaul
requirements. Likewise, given the CNO ' s long range schedule
for overhauls, there also seems to be adequate time to allow
the use of formal advertising. It is the third requirement,
the need to define the overhaul work package completely and
in detail, that has proven to be a the most difficult
obstacle in contracting for overhauls.
THE IMPACT OF PERSONNEL CONSIDERATIONS
The previous chapter discusses the role of the PERAs in
developing overhaul work packages. There remains, however,
another problem built into the process that must be overcome
before work requirements can be documented in the detail
required for using formal advertising. This problem
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involves the ships themselves and the crews that man those
ships .
As mentioned in the previous chapter, ship overhaul work
has become highly competitive in recent years. In addition
to the loss of much commercial work to shipyards overseas.
Naval ship overhaul requirements have declined as the number
of ships in the fleet was reduced following the war in
Vietnam. In spite of this reduction in the number of ships,
the Navy has attempted to continue to meet its obligations
at sea through greater dependence on technology and by keep-
ing its remaining ships in an operational status for longer
per iods .
The effect of these policies have been felt by the pri-
vate shipyards as fewer ships become available for overhaul.
Of those ships that are being overhauled, contractors are
finding that shipboard systems are becoming increasingly
complex and sophisticated, and that equipment on board those
ships has been operated for longer periods between
overhauls
.
Compounding this situation are the often discussed pro-
blems created by the all-volunteer Navy, problems that di-
rectly impact ship maintenance and overhaul contracts. The
corps of Navy petty officers trained to maintain those com-
plex ship systems are continually confronted with the choice
of either spending long periods at sea or accepting better
paying jobs with industry. In an effort to stem the flow of
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experienced personnel from the Navy, personnel retention has
become one of the Navy's most important priorities. in
addition to the direct effect the loss of skilled personnel
has had on the repair and maintenance of ship systems, this
situation has affected ship overhauls in three significant
ways .
First, in an effort to encourage retention, the Navy
attempts to allow Navy personnel the opportunity to be
located near homeports of their choice. This often causes
ships' crews to undergo major changes prior to commencement
of overhauls. With each major change in the crew comes a
major change in perceived overhaul requirements. Problems
the departing crew may have been willing to ignore now
become problems that must be solved. These preferences of
the crew often direct the way overhaul work is approached.
One common way the new crew affects the overhaul is
through a renewed attention to overhaul planning. Planning
that should have been accomplished by the crew twelve to
eighteen months earlier but was deferred due to operational
priorities now becomes the ship's most important concern.
The new crews, on board for the overhaul and the post-
overhaul deployment, actively work to rectify the earlier
crews' indifference by pressing for changes to the overhaul
contract
.
Secondly, many ships have spent long months at sea prior
to the commencement of their overhauls and normally face
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long deployments following the completion of their over-
hauls. As a result, an effort is made to allow overhauls no
be conducted as much like shore duty as possible. Command-
ing officers frequently authorize a four-day work week dur-
ing overhauls. Since ships are often already undermanned
during overhauls, the impact of fewer Navy personnel avail-
able to accomplish work assigned to ships' forces is felt
when shipyards attempt to coordinate jobs to accomplish work
called for in the contracts.
The third effect of the personnel retention effort
affects the awarding of contracts themselves. The NAVSEA
Repair Manual, the principal NAVSEA directive governing ship
overhauls, states that contracts should be awarded sixty
days prior to the commencement of scheduled overhauls. This
goal has been revised by the Chief of Naval Operations from
sixty days to one hundred twenty days. The additional time
was considered the minimum necessary to allow families to be
moved in a more orderly manner prior to the commencement of
overhauls .
The change in the schedule mandated by the CNO has
required alterations to the NAVSEA, SUPSHIP, and PERA plan-
ning schedules for ship overhauls. Where once the goal was
to ensure a requirements package was defined and confirmed
at a work definition conference at least six months prior to
the commencement of the overhaul, the goal now is to have a
contract awarded by this point in time. It is now necessary
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to attempt to conduct the work definition conference ten
months prior to overhaul commencement. Included in this
commitment is the assumption that a ship's requirements will
change little during those ten months. Prior to this change
in policy, defining the overhaul requirements for a ship
commencing overhaul after returning from a deployment was
already a significant problem. With these revised schedule
objectives, only the most routine, planned requirements can
be expected to remain unchanged in the overhaul packages.
The end result of these circumstances is to place the
Navy in a situation in which objectives are in direct oppo-
sition to each other. Formally advertised contracts require
a specific definition of work. In the case of ship over-
hauls this means that, if contract changes are to be mini-
mized, work must commence as near the time of inspection and
contract award as possible. Personnel requirements, how-
ever, dictate that contracts be awarded with as much delay
as possible between award and overhaul commencement. During
this delay crews and overhaul requirements change, directly
impacting the need for additional contract changes.
The CNO has frequently stated that the recruitment and
retention of quality personnel must receive priority atten-
tion. This relegation of ship overhaul requirements to a
role secondary to personnel considerations is unavoidable,
but it does place an additional burden on the ship overhaul
system, a system that is already severely strained in its.
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ability to cope with problems. The result will ultimately
be more contract changes, with even more attention given to




The preceding chapters have discussed a multitude of
interrelated problems, all applicable to the repair and
overhaul of ships but none which can be uniquely identified
as the growth and new work problem. The frustration of
those who have attempted to solve the issue of growth and
new work can largely be attributed to this initial issue of
problem definition. When considering that growth and new
work is a compilation of problems that span financial, mana-
gerial, contractual, and environmental concerns, this diffi-
culty in precisely defining the problem is understandable.




One area in which there is agreement regarding overhaul
problems involves a general concern for cost overruns and
schedule slippages. The concern for growth and new work
would be substantially less intense if ships were consist-
ently overhauled on schedule and within budget constraints.
Unfortunately, there is nothing to indicate that the Navy is
moving closer to solving these problems.
In a 1979 study of the nation's shipbuilders conducted
by Edward Kaitz and Associates, Kaitz found that, rather
than moving closer to solving these problems, the procedures
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presently used by the Navy actually compound problems.
Kai tz stated :
The private shipyard has little incentive to strive for
efficiency given the current market for new construction
and the contracting procedures mandated by the Department
of Defense ....
The first goal of the private sector is corporate
perpetuity. Given the vagaries of the demand for new
ships, the private yard is best served by lengthening
construction times and maximizing costs where (1) there is
no substantial penalty for not meeting delivery schedules
or cost estimates and (2) there are virtually no alterna-
tive uses for the yard's capacity. Change orders and
other controversies that allow for the creation of claims
are, we would allege, very often in the best long-term
interests of the shipyards. When settled, these claims
contain reimbursements for both direct (production) and
overhead (capability) costs. [6:12]
Some problems facing the Navy, such as contractors
"buying" contracts by bidding prices below their costs in
the hopes of making a profit on changes, are very difficult
to prove, especially since contractors are not required to
provide cost breakdowns of their proposals when replying to
invitations for bids. One proposed solution to this problem
is to contract for the overhaul of ships through the use of
cost type contracts instead of fixed price contracts. This
approach has been used for submarine overhauls for many
years, and was proposed by the General Accounting Office, in
a 1976 report, as a technique worth exploring. [18] The
Navy is presently experimenting with cost type contracts
with award fee provisions for the overhaul of non-nuclear
surface ships.
While cost contracts may allow the Navy to award con-
tracts earlier and with less definitive statements of work,
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cost contracts cannot be expected to solve all the Navy's
overhaul problems. In addition to being administratively
difficult to manage, cost contracts are innately biased in
favor of the large shipyards that can comply with the
detailed accounting procedures required by the Navy. The
politics of the ship repair industry will undoubtedly become
a factor to be considered if the Navy chooses to use cost
contracts for overhauling ships smaller and less complex
than the 963 class destroyers.
Finally, while cost contracts may eliminate some of the
problems created when using firm fixed price contracts,
there is no firm evidence to indicate that ships overhauled
using cost contracts will be repaired any faster, cheaper,
or better than under fixed price contracts. While award fee
provisions may provide the incentives required to encourage
contractors to strive for these objectives, the awards must
be greater than the rewards contractors can achieve by
lengthening construction times, maximizing costs, and
processing contract changes and claims.
MEASURING PERFORMANCE AGAINST STANDARDS
Evaluating the success of contracting methods, con-
tracting procedures, and contractors themselves has tradi-
tionally been more of a subjective art than an objective
analytical exercise. This has been one factor tht has
limited experimentation with various contract types, as well
as prevented the Navy from excluding many marginal shipyards
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from bidding on overhaul work. An effective evaluation
system must have standards that can be easily understood and
consistently applied. Developing and applying such stan-
dards is not easily accomplished, as is apparent from the
way the Navy defines and applies growth and new work
standards .
Compounding this requirement is the heterogeneous nature
of the ship repair industry. There are many difficult ques-
tions that must be resolved before standards can be devel-
oped for comparing and evaluating overhauls performed in
shipyards that control such dissimilar facilities. Each
answer raises more questions regarding how standards should
be maintained and implemented and how exceptions should be
evaluated. The list of politically sensitive issues is
almost endless, all stemming from the basic difficulty in
establishing evaluative standards in an environment that
resists quantification. It is just such difficulties in at-
tempting to quantify subjective values that contributed to
the acceptance of growth and new work expenditures as one
way to evaluate contractor performance.
The lack of any hard data, other than total overhaul
costs and duration of overhauls, for use in evaluating ship-
yard performance was the subject of an extensive General
Accounting Office (GAO) report completed in March 1978. The
report, directed primarily at the need for a better defi-
nition of shipyard mobilization requirements, tied that
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shortfall directly to the need for better management control
procedures in naval shipyards. [19] While it is difficult
to compare two systems that differ as greatly as naval ship-
yards and private shipyards, many procedures the Navy uses
in planning and evaluating overhauls in these two systems
are similar. One procedure that is particularly similar in
the two systems involves the preparation of the statement of
work. Both systems include the pre-overhaul test and
inspection (POT&I) from which estimates are developed that
provide much of the foundation for overhaul plans. In
evaluating this procedure, GAO stated:
While this procedure appears straight forward, the
validity of the estimates appears questionable because of
limited standards coverages and the inaccessibility of
relevant historical data. In lieu of basing job order
estimates either on labor standards or historical data
that accurately reflect the depth of work previously per-
formed and the labor it actually took, manually prepared
job orders in many cases replicate planning documents pre-
pared for prior overhauls. [19:31]
Within the controlled environment of naval shipyards, where
approximately two-thirds of the Navy's depot level mainte-
nance is performed, the GAO found that "shipyards no longer
place high priority on a sound methods and standards pro-
gram." [19:37] Without an effective program to evaluate
performance against standards, it becomes more apparent why
the Navy must look elsewhere, such as to growth and new work
expenditures, for management data.
One significant way the overhaul of Navy ships in pri-
vate shipyards differs from the overhaul of Navy ships in
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naval shipyards is in the use of accounting data. in naval
shipyards, cost data is readily available throughout the
overhaul. This can be contrasted to overhauls in private
shipyards where most contractors restrict access to account-
ing data. As a result, SUPSHIPs do not have the capability
to monitor contractors* overhaul costs while overhauls are
in progress.
Firm fixed price contracts, used for overhauls in pri-
vate shipyards, have the advantage of being simpler to ad-
minister than cost contracts, an advantage that is gained by
assigning most management decisions to the contractor. One
area of control the Navy agrees to relinquish when using
these contracts involves the accounting for overhaul costs.
Since most accounting functions are performed by contrac-
tors, information detailing how contractors' prices are
developed is not available to the SUPSHIPs.
In the absence of accurate cost information or perfor-
mance standards, a question arises regarding how the Navy
gets the data required to plan and manage overhauls in
private shipyards. The answer to this question is twofold.
First, for daily decisions involving specific overhauls,
SUPSHIPs must rely on their surveyors' and estimators'
reviews of the contractors' figures for most decisions. The
Naval Sea Systems Command's philosophy on this point is
that, when a firm fixed price contract is awarded, the con-
tractor is being paid to manage the contract. Under such
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contracts, the mechanism that is supposed to keep the
contractor efficient is the profit motive. Since these
contracts are formally advertised, the prices established
for overhaul contracts at the time of award are, by
definition, considered fair and reasonable. If the contrac-
tor is efficient he will earn his profit by keeping waste to
a minimum, eliminating the need for the Navy to either audit
his records or to maintain a duplicate management control
system to ensure waste is minimized. SUPSHIPs are therefore
staffed to review contractors' compliance with contracts.
Management of the overhauls is considered the responsibility
of the contractors.
The second data requirement the Navy has is for informa-
tion that will allow them to construct long range plans for
schedules and budgets. This information is provided to
NAVSEA by the SUPSHIPs in the form of Ship Departure Reports
and by the PERAs in the form of Post Overhaul Analysis Re-
ports. NAVSEA requires that these reports be completed and
forwarded to both NAVSEA and the type commanders within
sixty days of the completion of overhauls. The reports, in
conjunction with financial accounting reports, provide the
data used by the Navy to plan overhaul schedules and to
prepare budgets.
While these are the reporting procedures, these require-
ments are not always met. Delays in submitting the reports,
and omissions in the reports themselves, are common.
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Examples of these problems can be found in audit reports
prepared by the Naval Audit Service. In one study conducted
at SUPSHIP Long Beach in March 1981, it was found that Ship
Departure Reports had not been prepared for almost two
years. [1:17] In another audit, conducted at SUPSHIP San
Diego in January 1981, the Naval Audit Service reported:
The required preparation and submission of extremely
detailed Ship Departure Reports within stringent time-
frames is a chronic point of contention between the Super-
visor organizations and NAVSEA. When and if prepared,
these reports purportedly provide the Fleet and Type Com-
manders with return costs of completed shipboard work
necessary for the development of future maintenance bud-
gets. The voluminous detail, extensive delinquencies in
submission, and supporting prorations and estimates make
these reports highly suspect in providing any sound basis
for budgeting or other accounting purposes. [20]
Delays were also found in the submission of the Post
Overhaul Analysis Reports prepared by the PERAs . Compound-
ing these problems are the difficulties the PERAs and the
SUPSHIPs encounter in substantiating the data that is
included in these reports. This situation is partially
caused by the absence of overhaul review systems within the
SUPSHIPs and partially due to the lack of manpower resources
within the PERAs and the SUPSHIPs that must be dedicated to
preparing these reports.
THE NAVY'S PREFERENCE FOR THE "GROWTH" LABEL
Given the problems that occur in both short- and long-
term data collection, the question returns to the validity
of the use of financial reports, including the measurement
of growth and new work expenditures, for use as management
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data. The previous chapter discussed how the Navy's ac-
counting system is designed to report not what was spent on
growth and new work, but how much of current and prior fis-
cal year funds have been expended. Also discussed was how
there is no general agreement at any level within the ship
overhaul system regarding what should be included as growth
and what should be included as new work. In addition to the
inconsistent application of procedures for measuring and
evaluating growth and new work discussed earlier, the mea-
surement of growth and new work is further distorted through
pressures exerted by the type commanders' representatives on
the SUPSHIPs to label changes as growth work.
Part of the type commanders' preference for labeling
changes as growth work stems from political considerations.
As discussed earlier, large expenditures for new work are
indicative of poorly planned overhauls. Large numbers of
new work changes create the appearance that the type com-
manders buried their contractors under an unreasonable
amount of work that was not included in the basic contract,
causing many problems that subsequently occur. By labeling
the majority of changes as growth items, the type commanders
can, to a large extent, disclaim responsibility for cost
overruns and schedule slippages. While this is one consid-
eration, and probably the most sensitive issue from the
viewpoint of the contractors, it is also probably the factor
of least consequence to the type commanders.
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Of much greater importance to the type commanders, the
SUPSHIPs, and to the ships themselves are schedule consider-
ations. To the type commanders, the system for processing
change orders appears to be as agonizingly slow and ineffi-
cient as it does to the contractors. When changes are
labeled as growth changes, the type commanders' representa-
tives have much greater flexibility to approve and direct
that the changes proceed. Growth funds from prior fiscal
years are almost always available, and there is rarely any
question about the need to proceed with a genuine growth
requi rement
.
If new work funds are required, an additional delay is
often injected into the process, since the request must
often be routed for financial screening before approval can
be granted. In one case this delay in receiving financial
approval was observed to be almost two weeks. Such a delay
can cause extraordinarily expensive repercussions if the
required change affects the overhaul's critical path. It
is for this reason the SUPSHIPs attempt to avoid lengthy
challenges to the type commanders' requests that growth
funds be used to pay for changes. The SUPSHIPs will
normally choose the alternative that will allow changes to
be effected as quickly as possible while allowing general
compliance with the law.
The type commanders' concern for using prior fiscal
years' money stems from the fact that it is very common for
72

current tiscal year funds to be inadequate to cover all
known requirements. This is reflected in the way work defi-
nition conferences tailor overhaul requirements submitted
for inclusion in work packages. Funding, rather that sched-
ules, drives the problem. The type commanders allocate a
specific amount of money for the basic contract require-
ments, while deferring or cancelling requirements that
exceed their budgets. If funds become available after the
contracts are awarded, as can occur when other overhauls are
completed without using all budgeted funds, the type com-
manders can then direct that additional work be included in
the remaining overhauls. By rearranging current and prior
fiscal year funds in this manner, the type commanders can
get much more work accomplished than if the funds were
allowed to lapse. It was such a reassignment of funds that
allowed additional work to be included in the overhaul of
the USS RALEIGH, allowing many essential jobs to be per-
formed while causing a minimum of a million dollars in
overruns and adding at least four months to the overhaul.
GROWTH AND NEW WORK AS A MANAGEMENT ISSUE
Again, questions arise regarding why adequate time and
funds are not factored into overhaul plans well in advance,
allowing these problems to be avoided. The answer, once
again, returns to the lack of an adequate reporting system
that would allow data to be returned to NAVSEA and to the
type commanders for developing such plans. Feedback loops
73

to these central managers are weak, and information provided
is both late and incomplete.
When NAVSEA and the type commanders forward overhaul
schedule and cost forecasts to the CNO for development of
long range plans, these forecasts echo the problems that '
were encountered when that data was collected from the
SUPSHIPs and the PERAs . After information is provided, it
becomes very difficult to change the system once operational
schedules are developed and budget requests are submitted.
Even when it appears likely that problems will occur, the
information required to refute earlier submissions remains
too weak to request that schedules and budgets be changed.
The individuals involved in managing the Navy's overhaul
effort find that it is a system with a span of control so
wide that effecting management changes is impractical. The
only alternative available to them is to attempt to make
ship overhauls fit within the schedules directed by the CNO
and within the budgets provided by the type commanders,
using a system that, according to Kaitz, provides incentives
to contractors to lengthen construction times and maximize
costs. The frustration this conflict causes is compounded
by shortages of personnel at the SUPSHIP and PERA levels,
coupled with a workload that many find unmanageable.
An example of the problems being experienced at one
SUPSHIP was observed when a contracting officer was asked
about his progress in processing a particular contractor's
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multi-million dollar claim for equitable adjustment, a claim
that had been outstanding for almost six months. The con-
tracting officer replied that he presently had over a thou-
sand contract changes pending, some over a year old, and
that the one claim in question was just one of several re-
quests for equitable adjustment that exceeded several mil-
lion dollars. There were simply not enough trained people
available on his staff to allow the claim to be processed in
a timely manner.
When the division head responsible for evaluating the
claim was asked about his backlog of work, he explained that
there were eight people, including himself, working in his
division. In addition to the evaluation of claims, his di-
vision was responsible for evaluating overhaul bids, prepar-
ing technical advisory reports, conducting on-site surveys
prior to the awarding of master ship repair contracts, nego-
tiating contract labor rates, conducting pre-award surveys,
issuing change orders, and evaluating constructive change
claims as they occured. Two people in his division were
temporary clerical assistants. Of the remaining six, four
of his people had been on the job less than four months.
Only two, including himself, had received any formal train-
ing in contract administration at all. His only comment on
this situation was that he was actively looking for another
position elsewhere, even if this meant leaving his chosen
career field in ship repair work.
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These types of problems are not limited to any one
office. In an audit of SUPSHIP Long Beach completed in
March 1981, the Naval Audit Service found:
Ceiling point and manpower deficiencies have resulted in
SUPSHIP not performing some necessary fuctions, falling
behind in others, jeopardizing the completion of major
work in progress, and incurring significant overtime to
supplement the shortage of personnel. [1:3]
Commenting on conditions found at SUPSHIPs in general, the
Naval Audit Service stated:
The undermanning of SUPSHIPs has been a chronic problem
since FY 1974, which was triggered by the closing of
several Naval Shipyards and compounded by imposed employ-
ment limitations and increasing quantity and complexity in
the assignments of Navy overhauls to private shipyards.
[1:4]
The migration of experienced personnel away from the
SUPSHIPs to better paying, less stressful, and more reward-
ing jobs with either industry or other government agencies
has placed a significant strain on the ability of SUPSHIPs
to perform their work. The result of this situation has
been to create a downward spiral in the efficiency, effec-
tiveness, and capabilities of the SUPSHIPs and PERAs . As
personnel become more experienced in ship overhaul work,
they develop the skills that make them more attractive to
employers elsewhere. As personnel move to better jobs, the
burden of work shifts to the remaining experienced indivi-
duals until they, too, look elsewhere for work.
In industry an expected remedy for this situation would
be to send in a strong, capable, and experienced manager to
direct the necessary actions to solve the problems that
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exist. The Navy looks to their officer corps for such lead-
ership. However, the officers reporting to the SUPSHIPs and
PERAs are extremely limited in their authority to hire or
fire or to adjust pay or benefits. Likewise, they often
lack the necessary experience to take prompt action on those
areas they can affect. When they finally do develop some
degree of knowledge and proficiency necessary to manage the
very difficult work that confronts them, they are
transferred .
The decline in the quality of work performed by person-
nel at the SUPSHIPs and the PERAs is a problem that is
generally recognized by the SUPSHIPs, the PERAs, and NAVSEA,
but it is most evident to the ship repair businessmen who
have performed contract work for the Navy over a period of
years. It is a problem that continues to become more severe
as the quality of people entering the field declines while
experienced and trained personnel retire or leave the
SUPSHIPs and PERAs.
Confronted with the myriad of problems facing ships in
overhaul, the upgrading of the work force at the PERAs and
the SUPSHIPs has become a secondary consideration. Most
formal training of estimators, surveyors, and contract ad-
ministration personnel is either marginal or non-existent.
The SUPSHIPs and the PERAs depend heavily on attracting
people from the ship repair trades to fill positions. Once
new people have been hired from the trades, on-the-job
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training becomes the most common way to teach them their
newly required skills. Contract administration personnel
are occassionally given the opportunity to attend schools,
but schools that are available are very general in nature,
and are not designed for solving the unique problems that
occur during the overhaul of ships.
Formal training for surveyors, estimators, and speci-
fication writers is almost exclusively limited to corre-
spondence courses. Classroom training was only recently
begun, but it is a limited effort designed in the hope that
required skills taught to division supervisors will be
passed on to subordinates. For the most part, training has
continued to receive what one manager in NAVSEA's SUPSHIP
Management Program described as NAVSEA's "lowest priority."
The one common denominator that can be found in this
discussion of growth and new work— a discussion that has
included the Navy's need for better relations with industry,
as well as the need for better contract management, better
financial management, better contract specifications, better
reporting systems, and particularly, better decisions at the
levels where the problems are occurring— is in the people
who must make it all work. When considered in these terms,
growth and new work can be reduced to one single issue.





VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSIONS
Measuring the dollars that are expended for growth and
new work in ship overhaul contracts is an ineffective means
to evaluate the management or control of ship overhauls.
The allocation of dollars for growth and for new work is a
financial issue involving the control of funds allocated for
the repair and overhaul of ships. The Navy's management of
these funds is inconsistent, varying among fleet commanders,
type commanders, and SUPSHIPs. The choice of funds that are
used to pay for ship repairs and overhauls has become an
issue among ship repair contractors because the Navy has
used the measurement of prior and current fiscal year expen-
ditures as an inappropriate means to evaluate overhauls. It
is expected that, by eliminating this as a technique for
evaluating overhauls, this issue will be placed in correct
perspective as a matter of internal financial control for
Navy ship repair funds.
The issue of growth and new work has been assigned more
value than can be justified. It is a concept that is poorly
understood by both shipyard and Navy managers, an issue that
has been argued for years with little to show for the effort
expended. It survives as an issue not due to any innate
value that measurements of growth and new work contribute to
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the overhaul process, but due to the lack of any better
means to evaluate overhaul management and control.
Growth and new work have taken on added significance in
recent years largely because of the need for better manage-
ment information as ship overhauls continue to require more
time and money than schedules and budgets allow. The need
for better controls has become critical in recent years as
the problems facing the Navy have become greater, a situa-
tion compounded by: operational requirements that demand
that depot-level maintenance be accomplished on schedule;
the seriously depressed nature of the ship repair industry;
the increased complexity of ship overhaul requirements; a
deterioration in the quality of entry-level personnel, par-
ticularly within the SUPSHIPs, that has contributed to a
decline in the quality of problem resolution at the time
problems occur; and an increase in the adversarial relation-
ship between ship repair contractors and the Navy's front-
line managers.
The shortcomings of the Navy's management data, as
discussed in General Accounting Office reports, is recog-
nized by Navy managers at all levels of the ship overhaul
process. The problem would have been resolved long ago if
not for the prohibitive costs involved in developing a com-
prehensive reporting system. Naval Sea System Command
figures show that payments to contractors for non-nuclear




$550 million. While the GAO has frequently faulted the
Navy's management reporting system, it has not been shown
that the the costs required to implement an extensive
reporting system would be off-set by the savings that might
be realized from the investment of additional hardware,
software, and personnel required to implement a truly effec-
tive management reporting system.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Discontinue the use of segregated growth and new work
expenditures as a means for evaluating or comparing the
quality of overhauls--Procedures followed by type command-
ers, fleet commanders, SUPSHIPs, PERAs, and NAVSEA for
measuring growth and new work are incongruous, resulting in
growth and new work determinations that do not contribute to
a better understanding of overhaul management. Even if such
measurements could be made consistent, these values would
still only show the obligations and expenditures for ship
overhauls in prior and current fiscal years. Figures
detailing overhaul costs show amounts spent for overhauls,
and nothing more.
2. Incorporate definitions for growth and new work within a
NAVSEA directive applicable to all SUPSHIPs— In the absence
of specific guidance from NAVSEA, the SUPSHIPs have been re-
quired to locally establish procedures for evaluating growth
and new work changes. The inconsistent procedures followed
by the SUPSHIPs have, in some cases, significantly
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contributed to SUPSHIP problems in managing, controlling,
and evaluating current and prior fiscal year expenditures
for ship repairs and overhauls.
Some activites, such as SUPSHIP Portsmouth, have promul-
gated definitions and procedures that not only meet local
requirements, but also meet the criteria established by
federal law for managing public funds. It is recommended
that NAVSEA solicit definitions and procedures from all
SUPSHIPs for defining, managing, and controlling growth and
new work, evaluate the information provided, and promulgate
the most feasible definitions and procedures from the
SUPSHIPS in a NAVSEA directive. There are no definitions
for growth and new work that will meet the needs, desires,
and preferences of all those concerned with ship overhauls.
However, once clear, concise, and proven definitions and
procedures are promulgated, an identified common ground will
exist to serve as a basis for future improvements.
3. Simplify SUPSHIP and PERA reporting procedures
—
Procedures currently followed by SUPSHIPs and PERAs fail to
provide accurate, timely, and complete management data to
NAVSEA. It is recommended that NAVSEA simplify reporting
procedures to improve the reliability and usefulness of data
collected
.
4. Implement a training, hiring, and retention program to
upgrade the quality of personnel within SUPSHIPs--The
continuing loss of qualified and capable SUPSHIP personnel
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is considered to be the primary cause of many ship overhaul
problems presently being experienced. problems that should
be resolved by trained and competent waterfront managers are
accumulating as disputes and claims, and subsequently sur-
facing at NAVSEA for resolution. Better management of these
problems, at the lowest level possible, would eliminate much
of the need for data NAVSEA presently requires to resolve
these matters.
5. Train ships' crews to allow them to be incorporated as
positive contributors to the ship overhaul process
—
The cooperation and involvement of the ships' crews is
frequently the factor that decides the "success" or
"failure" of overhauls. In spite of the importance of
capable and motivated crews, there is rarely any effort to
train ships' crews regarding what to expect during over-
hauls, how to initiate changes to overhaul contracts, how to
coordinate the ships' work with the shipyards' work, or what
options are available to settle disputes that arise during
overhauls. Informal commitments and constructive changes
caused by misdirected efforts of ships' crews attempting to
improve the quality of overhauls need to be recognized as
costs the shipyards will, in some way, recover. An active
program to minimize these costs is required.
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AREAS FOR CONTINUING RESEARCH
The following topics are proposed as areas that may
warrant additional research:
1. Compare NAVSEA ship overhaul data requirements with the
SUPSHIPs' ability to provide data.
a. Identify areas in which data can be collected using
existing source documents;
b. Identify areas where procedures can be automated.
2. Conduct a study to review the impact of personnel turn-
over within SUPSHIPs.
a. Compare SUPSHIP personnel turnover with turnovers
experienced in the ship repair industry and the ship con-
struction industry, as well as within other federal govern-
ment field management offices;
b. Attempt to identify the reasons turnover occurs
within the SUPSHIPs;
c. Recommend procedures to minimize the turnover of
personnel
.
3. Review current procedures for training personnel at
SUPSHIPs.
a. Identify strengths and weaknesses of current
training programs;
b. Develop training programs to overcome weaknesses.
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4. Develop a training program in basic overhaul procedures
and contract administration procedures for ships' crews
commencing overhauls.
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